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1.	  Introduction:	  Laying	  the	  Conceptual	  Groundwork	  
	  It	   is	   the	   habit	   in	  much	   recent	   literature	   on	   paternalism	   to	   begin	   by	   setting	   up	  anti-­‐paternalism	  as	  the	  status	  quo,	  and	  then	  outlining	  a	  supposedly	  controversial	  argument	  for	  some	  limited	  form	  of	  paternalism.	  Yet	  this	  form	  is	  so	  common	  that	  it	   is	   difficult	   to	   see	   anti-­‐paternalism	   as	   the	   status	   quo	   any	   longer.	   Certainly,	  ‘paternalism’	   is	   often	   used	   as	   a	   term	   of	   disapprobation	   in	   contemporary	  discourse,	  and	  we	  have	  many	  anti-­‐paternalist	  intuitions,	  resenting	  institutions	  or	  individuals	  who	  interfere	  in	  our	  lives	  for	  what	  they	  take	  to	  be	  our	  own	  good.	  If	  the	  crux	  of	  paternalism	  involves	  treating	  an	  adult	  like	  a	  child	  –	  treating	  someone	  who	  is	  competent	  to	  direct	  their	  own	  life	  as	  if	  they	  were	  not	  so	  competent	  –	  then	  many	   would	   consider	   themselves	   anti-­‐paternalists.	   Yet	   we	   also	   have	   many	  paternalist	   intuitions:	  many	  believe	   the	  state	  should	  prohibit	   slavery	  contracts,	  forbid	  the	  sale	  of	  heroin,	  and	  require	  us	  to	  wear	  our	  seatbelts.1	  	  	  There	   is	   little	   straightforward	   debate	   between	   ‘paternalists’	   and	   ‘anti-­‐paternalists’,	   then.	   Even	   those	   at	   the	   anti-­‐paternalist	   end	  of	   the	   spectrum	  only	  argue	   that	   paternalism	   is	  presumptively,	   or	  prima	   facie	   impermissible.	   Instead,	  much	  current	  debate	  centres	  on	  how	  paternalism	  should	  be	  defined,	  and	  why	  it	  might	   be	  wrong,	   and	   it	   is	   these	   debates	   I	   review	   here.	   I	   begin	   by	   considering	  whether	  paternalism	  should	  be	  understood	  as	   interference	  with	  our	   liberty	   for	  our	  own	  good,	  or	  only	  as	  restriction	  of	  our	  voluntary	  or	  autonomous	  acts	  (§2).	  If	  paternalism	   cannot	   be	   defined	   by	   reference	   to	   the	   restriction	   imposed	   on	   the	  paternalised	  agent,	  it	  can	  perhaps	  instead	  be	  defined	  by	  reference	  to	  the	  unique	  insulting	  motive	   of	   the	   paternaliser:	   the	   distrust	   of	   another’s	   ability	   to	   choose	  well	  for	  themselves,	  and	  an	  assumption	  that	  they	  can	  choose	  better	  (§3).	  Whilst	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Indeed,	  even	  the	  supposed	  poster	  children	  for	  liberal	  anti-­‐paternalism	  –	  J.S.	  Mill	  (1974)	  and	  Joel	  Feinberg	   (1986)	   –	   allow	   for	   some	   such,	   seemingly	   paternalist,	   prohibitions	   (most	   notably,	   of	  voluntary	   slavery).	   Further,	   there	   is	   evidence	   to	   suggest	   the	   general	   public	   does	   not	   always	  object	  to	  paternalist	  policies	  and	  institutions	  (Blumenthal	  2013;	  Sunstein	  2015a).	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this	  approach	  seems	  promising,	  some	  have	  argued	  that	  such	  a	  motive	  is	  neither	  unique,	  nor	  need	  be	  insulting,	  given	  that	  we	  are	  all	  poor	  reasoners,	  at	  least	  some	  of	  the	  time	  (§4).	  Finally,	  then,	  I	  will	  consider	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  normative	  core	  of	  paternalism	  is	  not	  that	  we	  mistrust	  individuals’	  abilities	  (which	  may	  be	  justified),	  but	   that	   we	   fail	   to	   see	   their	   autonomy	   as	   grounding	   an	   exclusionary	   reason	  against	  using	  this	  distrust	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  our	  actions	  (§5).	  	  	  First,	   though,	  given	   the	  proliferation	  of	   (sometimes	  contradictory)	   terminology	  in	  this	  field,	  it	  is	  worth	  beginning	  with	  a	  brief	  sketch	  of	  the	  conceptual	  landscape.	  Paternalism	  is	  standardly	  defined	  as	  “interference	  of	  a	  state	  or	  an	  individual	  with	  another	  person	  against	   their	  will,	   and	  defended	  or	  motivated	  by	   the	  claim	  that	  the	  person	  interfered	  with	  will	  be	  better	  off	  or	  protected	  from	  harm”	  (Dworkin	  2014).2	  The	   key	   elements	   here	   are	   that	   an	   individual	   is	   prevented	   from,	   or	  manipulated	  into,	  performing	  an	  action	  or	  making	  a	  choice,	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  this	  will	   be	   in	   their	   own	  best	   interests,	   and	  usually	   the	   associated	   assumption	   that	  they	  are	  not	  the	  best	  judge	  of	  their	  interests.	  This	  is	  ‘hard	  paternalism’.	  	  	  Anti-­‐paternalists	   object	   that	   such	   interference	   “wrongly	   subordinat[es]	   the	  individual’s	  right	  to	  her	  good”	  (Arneson	  2005:	  260).	  The	  strongest	  form	  of	  anti-­‐paternalism	   –	   ‘hard	   anti-­‐paternalism’	   –	   suggests	   that	   we	  must	   never	   interfere	  with	  any	  self-­‐regarding	  choice	  or	  action	  performed	  by	  an	  adult.3	  Yet	  this	  leads	  to	  the	   implausible	   conclusion	   that	   we	   cannot	   interfere	   even	   if	   a	   choice	   is	   not	  autonomous	   or	   voluntary:	   if	   an	   individual	   is	   being	   coerced,	   if	   they	   lack	  knowledge	   of	   the	   relevant	   empirical	   facts,	   are	   in	   a	   disturbed	   emotional	   state,	  base	  their	  choice	  on	  mistaken	  reasoning,	  or	  have	  not	  carefully	  considered	  their	  decision.4	  The	  most	  famous	  case	  is	  Mill’s	  (1974:	  166)	  individual	  about	  to	  cross	  a	  rotten	  bridge:	  surely	  it	  would	  not	  be	  paternalist	  to	  intervene	  to	  ensure	  they	  were	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Dworkin	  (2013:	  29-­‐31)	  provides	  variations	  on	  this	  standard.	  	  3	  As	   noted,	   few	   are	   willing	   to	   adopt	   either	   hard	   anti-­‐paternalism	   or	   hard	   paternalism,	   though	  Wall	   (2009:	   399–341)	   has	   argued	   that	   consistency	   requires	   that	   libertarians	   take	   the	   former	  view.	  Arneson	  (1980)	  has	  also	  defended	  this	  view	  but	  has	  since	  changed	  his	  position	  (Arneson	  2005).	   We	   may	   also	   make	   a	   pragmatic	   shift	   to	   hard	   anti-­‐paternalism	   if	   we	   think	   paternalist	  intervention	  will	  be	   ineffective:	  the	  punishment	  we	  impose	  to	  prevent	  harmful	  conduct	  may	  be	  worse	  than	  what	  it	  aims	  to	  prevent	  (Husak	  2013:	  51).	  Sarah	  Conly	  (2013,	  2016)	  defends	  a	  form	  of	   hard	   paternalism,	   justified	   by	   appeals	   to	   our	   frequent	   irrationality;	   as	   does	   Danny	   Scoccia	  (2008),	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  it	  is	  the	  only	  way	  to	  justify	  those	  paternalist	  policies	  that	  are	  plausible	  and	  desirable.	  4	  These	  are	  Feinberg’s	  (1986:	  104-­‐106)	  conditions	  of	  making	  a	  voluntary	  choice.	  Given	  that	  few	  decisions	   completely	   fulfil	   these	   conditions,	   Feinberg	   understands	   voluntariness	   as	   scalar.	   The	  problems	   this	   can	   pose	   for	   soft	   paternalism	  will	   be	   considered	   below.	  We	  may	   think	   some	   of	  these	   problems	   can	   be	   avoided	   by	   having	   a	   more	   binary	   definition	   of	   voluntariness,	   such	   as	  Olsaretti’s,	   where	   a	   non-­‐voluntary	   choice	   is	   one	   that	   is	   performed	   because	   there	   are	   no	  acceptable	   alternatives	   (Olsaretti	   1998;	   Colburn	   2008),	   though	   I	   do	   not	   discuss	   this	   position	  here.	   Further,	   following	   the	   soft	   paternalist	   literature	   I	   take	   voluntariness	   to	   be	   an	   essential	  component	  of	  autonomy,	  though	  Olsaretti	  (1998:	  73)	  disagrees	  with	  this	  characterisation.	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aware	   of	   the	   bridge’s	   state,	   so	   their	   decision	   to	   endanger	   their	   life	   was	   really	  voluntary.	   Such	   cases	   led	   Feinberg	   to	   suggest	   a	   more	   moderate	   form	   of	   anti-­‐paternalism	  –	  soft	  paternalism	  –	  according	  to	  which	  we	  should	  not	  interfere	  with	  adults’	  voluntary	  choices	  (regardless	  of	   their	  consequences),	  but	  people	  can	  be	  protected	  from	  the	  harmful	  consequences	  of	  their	  involuntary	  choices.	  	  Soft	   paternalism	   is	   sometimes	   used	   to	   describe	   paternalism	   that	   intervenes	   to	  help	  individuals	  achieve	  goals	  they	  have	  set	  for	  themselves;	  as	  opposed	  to	  hard	  paternalism	  which	  aims	  to	  ensure	  individuals	  achieve	  ends	  that	  are	  taken	  to	  be	  good	   for	   them,	   regardless	   of	   their	   opinion	   (Haybron	   and	   Alexandrova	   2013).	  This	   distinction	   has	   also	   been	   described	   as	   one	   between	   weak	   and	   strong	  paternalism	   (Dworkin	   2014),	   loose	   and	   strict	   paternalism	   (Scoccia	   2013:	   76),	  and	  means	  and	  ends	  paternalism	  (Le	  Grand	  and	  New	  2015:	  101-­‐104).	  I	  will	  use	  soft	  paternalism	  in	  Feinberg’s	  sense	  here.5	  Although	  it	  has	  its	  roots	  with	  Mill,	  the	  distinction	  between	  hard	  and	  soft	  paternalism	  remains	  one	  of	  the	  most	  central	  to	  any	  discussion	  of	  paternalism,	  and	  this	  will	  be	  my	  focus.	  	  	  
2.	  Against	  Soft	  Paternalism:	  Is	  Autonomy	  All	  That	  Matters?	  	  At	   first	   glance,	   soft	   paternalism	   seems	   clearly	   preferable	   to	   hard	   anti-­‐paternalism,	  since	  it	  allows	  intervention	  to	  prevent	  non-­‐voluntary	  self-­‐harm.	  It	  is	  surely	  a	  concern	  for	  autonomy,	  rather	  than	  mere	  negative	  liberty,	  that	  motivates	  the	  anti-­‐paternalist	   stance:	   the	   idea	   that	   individuals	  should	  be	  enabled	   to	   form	  and	   pursue	   their	   own	   conception	   of	   the	   good,	   without	   outside	   pressure,	  coercion,	  or	  manipulation.	  Further,	  that	  allowing	  someone	  to	  freely	  do	  what	  they	  want,	   when	   this	   undermines	   their	   real	   desires,	   is	   inimical	   to	   autonomy.	   As	  Feinberg	   (1986:	   12)	   notes,	   choices	   arising	   from	   ignorance,	   coercion,	   or	  derangement	  may	  be	  as	  “alien	  to	  [us]	  as	  the	  choices	  of	  someone	  else”.	  Yet	  despite	  this	   intuitive	   plausibility,	   soft	   paternalism	   and	   the	   focus	   on	   autonomy	   has	  become	  the	  subject	  of	  significant	  criticism	  in	  recent	  years,	  both	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  it	  allows	  for	  too	  much	  interference,	  and	  that	  it	  allows	  for	  too	  little.	  	  	  We	  may	  not	  much	  care	  about	  intervention	  in	  our	  free	  choices	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  rotten	  bridge,	  but	  soft	  paternalist	  rationales	  can	  be	  used	  to	  justify	  wide-­‐ranging	  interference.	  This	  is	  especially	  so	  when	  we	  note	  that	  soft	  paternalism	  is	  not	  only	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Distinctions	  have	  also	  been	  drawn	  between	  pure	  or	  direct	  paternalism	  (in	  which	  the	  class	  being	  interfered	   with	   is	   identical	   with	   those	   whose	   welfare	   is	   improved),	   and	   impure	   or	   indirect	  paternalism	  (Dworkin	  2014;	  Archard	  unpublished).	  Between	  legal	  paternalism	  (interference	  for	  the	   sake	   of	   individuals’	   physical	   welfare),	   moral	   paternalism	   (interference	   for	   their	   moral	  welfare),	   and	   legal	   moralism	   (interference	   for	   their	   moral	   improvement,	   where	   this	   is	   not	  necessarily	  good	  for	  the	  interfered-­‐with	  individual)	  (Dworkin	  2005).	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used	   to	   justify	  preventing	   self-­‐inflicted	  non-­‐voluntary	  harm,	  but	   also	   to	  permit	  intervention	  to	  check	  if	  the	  harm	  is	  non-­‐voluntary,	  and	  the	  general	  prohibition	  of	  harmful	   activities	  on	   the	  basis	   that	   they	  are	  often	  engaged	   in	  non-­‐voluntarily.6	  Further,	  since	  soft	  paternalists	  cannot	  be	  certain	  harm	  will	  occur	  in	  most	  cases,	  they	  will	  intervene	  in	  non-­‐voluntary	  activities	  that	  carry	  some	  threshold	  level	  of	  risk	  of	  harm.	  As	  such,	  soft	  paternalism	  may	  be	  used	   to	   justify	   intervention	   in	  a	  variety	  of	  self-­‐regarding	  activities.	  	  	  Moreover,	  the	  process	  of	  defining	  the	  threshold	  level	  of	  autonomy	  itself	  may	  be	  paternalist.	   Certainly,	   this	   threshold	   is	   not	   obviously	   fixed,	   and	   where	   being	  classified	   as	   incompetent	   can	   lead	   to	   “fundamental	   exclusion”	   from	   society	  (Fateh-­‐Moghadam	  and	  Gutmann	  2014:	  389)	  and	  severely	  curtailed	  freedom,	  we	  must	  be	  careful	  that	  our	  selection	  of	  this	  threshold	  does	  not	  perpetuate	  our	  pre-­‐existing	  mistrust	  of	  certain	  groups,	  or	  those	  inclined	  to	  make	  certain	  choices.	  If	  this	  mistrust	   leads	  to	  unwarranted	  assumptions	  of	  non-­‐voluntariness,	   then	  soft	  paternalism	  may	  be	  used	  as	  a	  pretext	  for	  limiting	  voluntary	  choices	  for	  the	  sake	  of	   interfered-­‐with	   individuals,	  because	  we	  do	  not	   trust	   them	  to	  choose	  well,	  or	  indeed,	  trust	  them	  to	  choose	  voluntarily	  at	  all.7	  	  	  Further,	  even	  those	  who	  are	  rightly	  judged	  to	  be	  incompetent	  might	  be	  thought	  to	   be	   entitled	   to	   some	   liberty	   of	   action	   (Fateh-­‐Moghadam	   and	   Gutmann	   2014:	  391;	  Mullin	  2014).8	  Indeed,	  we	  are	  all	  incompetent	  –	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  not	  meeting	  all	   the	  criteria	  of	  voluntary	  choice	  –	  some	  of	   the	  time,	  and	  would	  not	  want	  our	  liberty	  of	  action	  interfered	  with	  in	  every	  case.	  Some	  may	  value	  the	  opportunity	  to	  make	  non-­‐voluntary	  choices	  without	   interference:	  “a	  person’s	  settled	  values,	  attitudes,	   and	  desires	  may	   include	   a	   disposition	   to	   impetuous	  decision-­‐making	  and	   an	   aversion	   to	   the	   careful	   consideration	   that	   renders	   choices	   voluntary”	  (Arneson	  2005:	  267).	  Whilst	  we	  may	  not	  wish	  to	  involuntarily	  harm	  ourselves,	  it	  is	   less	   obvious	   that	   all	   individuals	   will	   be	   averse	   to	   spontaneously	   exposing	  themselves	  to	  the	  risk	  of	  harm.	  	  	  The	   concern	   that	   the	   focus	   on	   autonomy	   can	   lead	   to	   excessive	   interference	   in	  individual	  liberty	  is	  even	  more	  marked	  in	  approaches	  that	  aim	  to	  maximise	  our	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  For	   example:	   Feinberg	   (1986:	   71-­‐81;	   124-­‐127);	   Fateh-­‐Moghadam	   and	  Gutmann	   (2014:	   386);	  Arneson	  (2005:	  272-­‐273);	  Shafer-­‐Landau	  (2005:	  173;	  176-­‐181).	  	  7	  Similarly,	   I	   have	   argued	   elsewhere	   that	   we	   must	   avoid	   unwarranted	   assumptions	   that	   the	  preferences	  and	  decisions	  of	  marginalised	  and	  vulnerable	  groups	  are	  ‘merely	  adaptive’,	  and	  can	  be	  ignored	  on	  this	  basis	  (Begon	  2015).	  	  	  8	  Daniel	  Groll	  (2012)	  offers	  an	  approach	  according	  to	  which	  the	  will	  of	   incompetent	  individuals	  can	   play	   a	   role	   in	   determining	   their	   treatment,	   though	   their	   will	   would	   not	   be	   considered	  
authoritative	  in	  this	  calculation	  –	  as	  it	  should	  be	  for	  competent	  individuals.	  This	  approach	  will	  be	  discussed	  below.	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autonomous	   choices.9	  Steven	   Wall	   suggests	   such	   an	   autonomy-­‐centred	   view	  whilst	   critiquing	   the	   libertarian	   account	   of	   paternalism.	   Wall	   starts	   from	   the	  observation	   that	   libertarians	   cannot	   uphold	   the	   distinction	   between	   soft	   and	  hard	   paternalism.	   A	   central	   feature	   of	   libertarianism	   is	   full	   self-­‐ownership:	  allowing	   individuals	   the	  most	  extensive	   set	  of	   stringent	   rights	  over	   themselves	  and	   their	  powers	   that	   is	   compatible	  with	  others	  having	   such	   rights.	  Given	   that	  individuals	  have	  a	  fuller	  set	  of	  self-­‐ownership	  rights	  if	  they	  are	  not	  subject	  to	  soft	  paternalistic	   interference,	   it	   seems	   libertarians	   must	   prohibit	   soft,	   as	   well	   as	  hard,	   paternalism	   (Wall	   2009:	   400-­‐404),	   and	   so	   adopt	   the	   implausibly	  permissive	  hard	  anti-­‐paternalism.	  In	  light	  of	  these	  difficulties,	  Wall	  proposes	  that	  libertarians	   might	   instead	   focus	   on	   full	   autonomous	   self-­‐ownership:	   the	   most	  extensive	  control	  over	  one’s	  autonomous	  choices.	  	  	  One	  benefit	  of	  such	  an	  approach	  would	  be	   that	   it	  avoids	  Feinberg’s	  reliance	  on	  harm:	   we	   do	   not	   need	   to	   make	   controversial	   judgements	   regarding	   what	  constitutes	  self-­‐harm	  (does	  cosmetic	  surgery	  count?),	  nor	  need	  we	  determine	  a	  threshold	   level	   of	   risk	   of	   harm	   that	   triggers	   interference	   (riding	   a	  motorcycle;	  riding	   a	  motorcycle	  without	   a	   helmet;	   riding	  without	   a	   helmet	  whilst	   drunk?).	  Yet	  without	  the	  notion	  of	  harm	  to	  guide	  us,	   interference	  would	  be	  permitted	  in	  
any	  non-­‐autonomous	  choice,	  including	  those	  that	  “bring	  no,	  or	  only	  trivial,	  harm”	  (Wall	   2009:	  411).10	  One	   solution	  might	  be	   to	   allow	   individuals	   stringent	   rights	  over	   autonomous	   choices,	   and	   non-­‐stringent	   rights	   over	   non-­‐autonomous	  choices.	  Thus,	  “self-­‐ownership	  rights	  become	  more	  stringent	  as	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	   choices	   they	   protect	   increases”	   (Wall	   2009:	   411).	   However,	   this	   will	   still	  require	   us	   to	   determine	  when	   choices	   count	   as	   autonomous	   enough	   to	   trigger	  stringent	   protection,	   and	   find	   some	   non-­‐arbitrary	   way	   of	   setting	   a	   strict	  threshold	  on	  a	  scalar	  concept.11	  	  	  A	  contrary	  line	  of	  criticism	  of	  soft	  paternalism	  is	  that,	  far	  from	  allowing	  too	  much	  intervention,	   it	   does	   not	   allow	   enough.	   Once	   assured	   the	   agent	   is	   choosing	  voluntarily,	  there	  is	  no	  limit	  on	  the	  harm	  we	  are	  allowed	  to	  inflict	  on	  ourselves:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  For	  example,	  Scoccia	  (2013:	  77-­‐78);	  and	  Nozick	  (1974)	  on	  Wall’s	  (2009:	  409)	  interpretation.	  	  10	  Due	  to	  the	  negative	  consequences	  of	  such	  interference,	  soft	  paternalists’	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	  judgement	  may	  not	  always	   favour	   intervention	   to	  prevent	   trivial	  harms,	  but	  Wall’s	  objection	   is	  that	  they	  lack	  a	  principled	  reason	  to	  rule	  it	  out.	  This	  possibility	  is	  troubling	  given	  that	  Feinberg	  (1986:	  94)	  insists	  “there	  is	  no	  such	  thing	  as	  a	  ‘trivial	  interference’	  with	  personal	  sovereignty”.	  	  11	  Michael	   Cholbi	   suggests	   that	   we	   can	   interfere	   in	   non-­‐autonomous	   choices	   (in	   which	   our	  “deliberation	   is	  distorted”	   (Cholbi	  2013:	  121)),	  only	  when	  they	  prevent	  us	   from	  achieving	  “our	  rationally	  chosen	  ends	  or	  conceptions	  of	  the	  good”	  (Cholbi	  2013:	  125).	  This	  allows	  a	  restriction	  on	  the	  non-­‐autonomous	  choices	  that	  are	  subject	  to	  intervention	  without	  appeal	  to	  harm,	  though	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  identifying	  which	  of	  an	  agent’s	  goals	  are	  central	  to	  their	  conception	  of	  the	  good	  will	  be	  any	  less	  controversial.	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suicide,	  slavery,	  amputation,	  heroin	  use,	  and	  lobotomy	  might	  all	  be	  permitted	  if	  we	   can	   be	   assured	   that	   the	   individual	   passes	   the	   threshold	   of	   a	   procedurally	  voluntary	  choice.	  These	  cases	  may	  seem	  especially	  troubling	  when	  we	  remember	  that	  to	  be	  immune	  to	  interference	  these	  choices	  need	  only	  be	  voluntary	  enough,	  where	   this	   determination	   “depends	   on	   a	   variety	   of	   factors,	   each	   of	   which	   is	  realisable	   in	   degrees	   and	   none	   of	   which	   is	   commensurable	  with	   one	   another”	  (Shafer-­‐Landau	  2005:	  190).	  	  	  Further,	  for	  those	  who	  believe	  that	  we	  have	  duties	  to	  ourselves	  –	  in	  virtue	  of	  our	  dignity,	  not	   to	  waste	   the	  opportunity	  provided	  by	  having	  a	   life	   (Arneson	  2005:	  279-­‐281)	   –	   the	   fact	   that	   a	   choice	   is	   voluntary	   (enough)	   may	   be	   deemed	  insufficient	  to	  change	  the	  permissibility	  of	  such	  acts.12	  The	  argument	  is	  not	  that	  the	   above	   acts	   are	   never	   permissible,	   only	   that	   they	   cannot	   be	   performed	   for	  “frivolous	   reasons”,	   simply	   because	  we	   have	  met	   the	   procedural	   conditions	   of	  voluntariness.	  For	  others,	   the	   concern	   is	  not	   that	   soft	  paternalism	  allows	  us	   to	  violate	   our	   duties	   to	   ourselves,	   but	   that	   it	   seems	   contradictory	   to	   allow	   our	  respect	   for	   individuals’	   autonomous	   capacities	   to	   lead	   us	   to	   permit	   them	   to	  sacrifice	  them.13	  If	  our	  concern	  is	  autonomy,	  where	  this	  involves	  having	  control	  over	  one’s	  life,	  and	  being	  able	  to	  act	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  deliberation	  and	  reflection	  on	  goals	  worth	  pursuing,	  then	  this	  should	  surely	  give	  us	  reason	  not	  only	  to	  protect	  choices,	   but	   also	   to	   limit	   them,	   when	   our	   choices	   undermine	   our	   capacity	   for	  control	  and	  deliberation	  (de	  Marneffe	  2006:	  72;	  81-­‐82;	  2013:	  70-­‐73).14	  	  	  Indeed,	  the	  central	  thread	  in	  much	  of	  the	  critical	  response	  to	  soft	  paternalism	  is	  that	   it	   leads	   us	   to	   place	   far	   too	  much	  weight	   on	   a	   line	   between	   voluntary	   and	  non-­‐voluntary	  choice.	  As	  Arneson	  (2005:	  268)	  puts	  it,	  the	  soft	  paternalist	  “has	  to	  urge	   the	   enormous	   overriding	   moral	   importance	   of	   the	   line	   between	   self-­‐harming	  choice	  that	  is	  not	  quite	  voluntary	  enough	  and	  choice	  that	  just	  passes	  the	  threshold	  of	  being	  voluntary	  enough”.	  Many	  contend	  that	  this	   line	  is	  difficult	  to	  draw	   non-­‐arbitrarily,	   and	   that	   it	   may	   not	   capture	   the	   motive	   underlying	   soft	  paternalism:	  a	  concern	  for	  individual	  autonomy,	  and	  a	  distrust	  of	  action	  that	  fails	  to	   respect	   this	   autonomy.	   Further,	   it	   may	   seem	   that	   “actions	   by	   themselves	  cannot	  be	  paternalistic”:	  paternalism	  depends	  on	  the	  reason	  why	  the	  action	  was	  carried	  out	  (Grill	  2007:	  445).	  Thus,	  a	  number	  of	  influential	  accounts	  have	  begun	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Also,	  Tadros	  (2011);	  Velleman	  (1999);	  Kant	  (2011:	  IV	  429-­‐430;	  1996:	  VI:	  421-­‐447);	  Arneson	  (2013:	  153-­‐155).	  	  13	  On	  some	  interpretations,	  it	  is	  this	  that	  led	  Mill	  to	  his	  prohibition	  of	  voluntary	  slavery	  (Dworkin	  1997:	  73).	  	  14	  Similarly,	  Ben-­‐Porath	  (2013)	  insists	  that	  paternalist	  policies	  may	  be	  necessary	  for	  democratic	  equality	   and	   meaningful	   choice.	   See	   also	   Quong	   (2011:	   98);	   Wall	   (2003:	   236;	   2013:	   105);	  (Sjöstrand	  et.	  al.	  2013).	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to	   focus	   not	   just	   on	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   choice	   interfered	   with	   (is	   it	   voluntary	  enough?),	  but	  on	  the	  motive	  of	  the	  putatively	  paternalist	  individual	  or	  institution	  (it	  is	  appropriately	  respectful?).	  Motivational	  accounts,	  to	  which	  I	  turn	  next,	  aim	  to	   identify	   paternalist	   acts	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   uniquely	   insulting	   negative	  judgement	  that	  is	  taken	  to	  motivate	  all	  instances	  of	  paternalism.15	  	  	  
3.	  The	  Paternalist	  Motive	  	  I	   will	   here	   consider	   some	   of	   the	  most	   influential	   and	   interesting	  motivational	  accounts	  of	  paternalism,	  beginning	  with	  Seana	  Shiffrin’s	  (2000),	  which	  contains	  a	  number	  of	   important	   features,	  some	  of	  which	  have	  been	  widely	   incorporated	  into	   subsequent	   accounts,	   and	   some	   of	   which	   have	   not.	   Shiffrin	   (2000:	   218)	  argues	  that	  an	  action	  is	  paternalist	  when	  A	  substitutes	  her	  judgement	  for	  B’s,	  on	  the	   assumption	   that	   her	   judgement	   is	   superior	   to	   B’s,	   and	   it	   aims	   to	   have	   (or	  avoid)	  an	  effect	  on	  “B’s	  own	  interests	  or	  matters	  that	  legitimately	  lie	  within	  B’s	  control”.	   The	   characteristically	   paternalist	   motive,	   then,	   is	   distrust	   of	   an	  individual’s	   agency	   regarding	   matters	   in	   her	   legitimate	   control,	   and	   an	  assumption	  that	  the	  patenaliser’s	  judgement	  is	  superior.	  	  	  Being	  motive-­‐based	  means	  both	   that	  not	   all	   coercion	   is	  paternalist	   (depending	  on	  its	  motive),	  and	  that	  not	  all	  paternalism	  is	  coercive.	  For	  example,	  if	  we	  refuse	  to	  help	  someone	  build	  some	  shelves	  because	  we	  think	  it	  would	  be	  good	  for	  them	  to	  learn	  carpentry,	  and	  do	  not	  trust	  them	  to	  learn	  without	  this	  push	  (and	  not	  for	  some	   self-­‐regarding	   reasons,	   such	   as	   the	   inconvenience	   of	   providing	   help)	  we	  treat	   them	   paternalistically,	   but	   without	   coercion	   (Shiffrin	   2000:	   213).	  Paternalism	  need	  not	   involve	  either	   the	   restriction	  of	   an	  agent’s	   liberty,	  or	   the	  violation	  of	  an	  autonomy	  right.	  Otherwise	  legitimate	  (non-­‐invasive	  or	  coercive)	  acts	  can	  become	  insulting,	  paternalist,	  and	  potentially	  impermissible	  on	  the	  basis	  of	   their	  motive.16	  Indeed,	  Shiffrin	   (2000:	  213-­‐214)	  suggests	   that	  even	   freedom-­‐
enhancing	  behaviour	  may	  be	  considered	  paternalist:	   if	  we	  are	  given	  options	  we	  have	   declared	   we	   would	   rather	   not	   have	   (perhaps	   because	   we	   find	   too	  much	  choice	   overwhelming,	   or	   worry	   about	   yielding	   to	   temptation)	   then	   to	   provide	  these	   options	   anyway	   (perhaps	   because	   they	   think	   we	   would	   have	   a	   better	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  motivational	  accounts	  need	  not	  be	  incompatible	  with	  soft	  paternalism.	  Soft	  paternalists	  can,	  and	  do,	  agree	  that	  the	  problem	  with	  interference	  in	  voluntary	  self-­‐harm	  is	  that	   it	  expresses	  a	  negative	   judgement	  of	   the	  agent’s	   capacity.	  Motivational	  accounts	  can	   agree	  that	   the	  negative	   judgement	   is	   only	   expressed	  when	   the	   interference	   is	  with	   agent’s	   voluntary	  self-­‐harming	  choices	  –	  though	  most	  expand	  the	  domain	  of	  problematic	  interventions	  beyond	  this,	  and	  take	  it	  as	  a	  benefit	  of	  their	  approach	  that	  acts	  that	  neither	  violate	  an	  individual’s	  autonomy	  rights,	  nor	  restrict	  their	  liberty,	  can	  still	  be	  considered	  paternalist,	  as	  we	  will	  see.	  	  16	  Also,	  Archard	  (1990:	  37).	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character	  if	  tested,	  or	  that	  the	  option	  we	  are	  trying	  to	  avoid	  is	  a	  good	  one)	  can	  be	  paternalist.	  	  Shiffrin	  also	   insists	   that	  paternalism	  need	  not	  be	  motivated	  by	  a	  distrust	  of	   an	  agent’s	  assessment	  of	  their	  interests.	  She	  argues	  that	  we	  can	  act	  paternalistically	  towards	  someone	  if	  we	  agree	  on	  what	   is	   in	  their	  best	   interests	  (and	  trust	   their	  ability	   to	   identify	   them),	   yet	   distrust	   their	   ability	   to	   effectively	   advance	   these	  interests.	   In	  other	  words,	  we	  trust	  their	   judgement,	  but	  distrust	  their	  will	  (Tsai	  2014:	   86).	   Thus,	   taking	   and	   hiding	   someone’s	   cigarettes	   without	   their	  permission	  is	  paternalist,	  even	  if	  they	  have	  agreed	  they	  want	  to	  stop	  smoking.17	  Moreover,	  paternalism	  need	  not	  involve	  acting	  against	  someone’s	  will.	  If	  we	  act	  on	   an	   agent’s	   behalf	   before	   they	   have	   had	   a	   chance	   to	   consider	   a	   matter	   and	  establish	   their	   intention,	   because	   we	   do	   not	   trust	   them	   to	   select	   the	   right	  outcome,	   then	   we	   fail	   to	   respect	   their	   autonomy,	   even	   if	   they	   would	   have	  favoured	  the	  outcome	  chosen	  for	  them.	  For	  example,	  if	  a	  doctor	  is	  concerned	  that	  their	   patient	   will	   refuse	   surgery,	   and	   so	   performs	   it	   before	   they	   have	   gained	  consciousness,	  they	  act	  paternalistically,	  even	  if	  the	  patient	  would	  have	  opted	  for	  the	  surgery	  (Groll	  2012:	  697-­‐8).	  	  All	   these	   acts	   are	   considered	   paternalist	   because	   they	   all	   involve	   ignoring	   or	  bypassing	   an	   individual’s	   agency	   because	   we	   distrust	   it	   (and	   assume	   our	  judgement	   is	   superior).	   By	   contrast,	   if	   we	   were	   to	   instead	   discuss	   the	   matter	  with	   the	  subject	  of	  paternalism,	  and	  attempt	  a	  process	  of	  reasoned	  persuasion,	  then	   (according	   to	   Shiffrin)	   this	   would	   show	   an	   appropriate	   respect	   for	   their	  agency,	   and	   so	   avoid	   paternalism.	   Yet	   George	   Tsai	   (2014)	   has	   recently	   argued	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  for	  rational	  persuasion	  to	  be	  paternalist	  too.	  He	  insists	  that	  not	  all	  rational	  persuasion	  is	  on	  a	  moral	  par.	  In	  some	  cases,	  the	  provision	  of	  reasons	  may	  pre-­‐empt	   someone’s	  deliberative	  activities,	   and	  undermine	   their	   ability	   to	  be	  self-­‐directing	  (Tsai	  2014:	  92-­‐95).	  Thus,	  as	   in	  the	  above	  cases,	  an	  act	  may	  be	  paternalist	  not	  because	  it	  opposes	  someone’s	  autonomy,	  but	  because	  it	  prevents	  them	  from	  exercising	  it.	  Whilst	  Shiffrin	  does	  not	  consider	  rational	  persuasion	  in	  this	   light,	   Tsai’s	   arguments	   are	   nonetheless	   consistent	   with	   her	   account	   given	  that	  he,	  too,	  identifies	  paternalism	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  motive	  –	  one	  of	  “distrust	  in	  the	  other’s	  capacity	  to	  adequately	  recognize	  or	  weigh	  reasons	  that	  bear	  on	  her	  good”	  (Tsai	  2014:	  111).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  This	   is	   means	   paternalism,	   on	   the	   above	   terminology.	   Means	   paternalism	   is	   defended	   as	  permissible	   by	   some	   on	   the	   basis	   that	   it	   simply	   allows	   individuals	   to	  more	   effectively	   achieve	  their	  own	  ends	  (Conly	  2013:	  100-­‐125;	  Le	  Grand	  and	  New	  2015:	  79-­‐104);	  though	  means	  and	  ends	  may	  not	  be	  easy	  to	  distinguish	  (Archard	  2013:	  398-­‐399).	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However,	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  there	  is	  one	  way	  in	  which	  Tsai’s	  account	  differs	  from	  Shiffrin’s:	  for	  Tsai	  the	  paternalist	  distrusts	  the	  individual	  to	  weigh	  reasons	  that	  bear	  on	  her	  good.	  Indeed,	  Shiffrin’s	  account	  differs	  from	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  paternalist	   accounts	   in	   insisting	   that	   a	   paternalist	   judgement	   need	   not	   be	  directed	   at	   improving	   an	   agent’s	   welfare,	   or	   protecting	   them	   from	   harm.	  Paternalist	   interventions	  may	   also	   be	   directed	   at	  matters	   that	   lie	   within	   their	  legitimate	  sphere	  of	  agency,	  and	  whilst	  we	  may	   think	   that	   this	  sphere	   includes	  control	  over	  whether	  we	  harm	  ourselves,	  it	  is	  surely	  broader	  than	  this.	  	  	  Shiffrin	  (2000:	  217)	  suggests	  two	  sorts	  of	  cases	  that	  seem	  to	  involve	  the	  unique	  paternalist	  insult,	  but	  are	  not	  directed	  at	  the	  interfered-­‐with	  agent’s	  interests.	  In	  the	  first,	  the	  paternalist	  motivation	  is	  directed	  at	  the	  welfare	  of	  a	  third	  party.	  For	  example,	  a	  park	  ranger	  prevents	  someone	  from	  making	  a	  difficult	  climb	  because	  they	   fear	   their	   spouse	   would	   be	   grief	   stricken	   if	   the	   worst	   happened.	   In	   the	  second,	   the	   interference	   does	   not	   involve	   a	   concern	   for	   anyone’s	   welfare.	   For	  example,	   someone	  asking	  a	  question	  at	   a	   conference	   is	   interrupted	  by	   another	  participant,	   who	   believes	   they	   could	   frame	   the	   point	   more	   eloquently,	   and	  proceeds	   to	   do	   so.	   In	   both	   cases,	   although	   the	   paternalist	   is	   not	   acting	   for	   the	  agent’s	  good,	   the	  act	   is	  no	   less	   insulting:	   it	   ‘treats	  us	   like	  children’	   for	  someone	  else	  to	  assume	  command	  over	  any	  domain	  of	  our	   life	  that	   is	   legitimately	   in	  our	  control,	   even	   if	   they	   are	   not	   doing	   it	   for	   our	   own	   good.	   In	   either	   case,	   Shiffrin	  (2000:	   220)	   argues,	   “the	   paternalist’s	   attitude	   shows	   significant	   disrespect	   for	  those	  core	  capacities	  or	  powers	  of	  the	  agent	  that	  underwrite	  and	  characterise	  his	  autonomous	  agency”.	  	  	  Few	  share	  Shiffrin’s	  intuitions	  about	  these	  cases,	  though	  some	  arguments	  against	  this	  position	   seem	   to	  miss	   the	  mark.	  For	  example,	   Jonathan	  Quong	  argues	   that	  Shiffrin’s	   focus	  on	   legitimate	   spheres	  of	  agency,	   rather	   than	   individual	  welfare,	  will	   lead	  to	   the	  misclassification	  of	  key	  cases.	  He	  gives	  an	  example	   in	  which	  he	  refuses	  to	  lend	  someone	  £50	  out	  of	  fear	  they	  will	  use	  it	  to	  fund	  their	  heroin	  habit	  (Quong	  2011:	  79-­‐80).	  He	  insists	  that	  since	  it	  is	  his	  £50,	  it	  is	  under	  his	  sphere	  of	  control,	   so	   Shiffrin	   cannot	   deem	   the	   refusal	   paternalist.	   Yet,	   surely,	   when	   we	  refuse	   to	   lend	   the	   money	   because	   we	   distrust	   how	   it	   will	   be	   spent	   (and	   not	  because	  we	  do	  not	  have	  £50	  to	  spare)	  we	  aim	  to	  influence	  our	  friend’s	  legitimate	  domain	  of	  control:	  something	  like,	  ‘control	  over	  what	  they	  do	  to	  their	  body’.	  The	  focus	   on	   legitimate	   domains	   of	   control,	   then,	   need	   not	   exclude	   omissions	   or	  refusals	   to	   aid	   as	   paternalist.	   Nonetheless,	   the	   inclusion	   of	   interference	   in	   our	  duties	  to	  third	  parties	  (such	  as	  our	  spouse	  or	  children)	  and	  our	  right	  to	  pursue	  our	   projects	   (such	   as	   question-­‐asking)	   within	   the	   scope	   of	   paternalism	   will	  
	   10	  
continue	   to	   strike	   many	   as	   counter-­‐intuitive.	   Further,	   Quong’s	   critique	   does	  bring	   to	   light	   the	   difficulty	   of	   determining	   what	   falls	   properly	   within	   the	  authority	   of	   the	   agent,	   and	   the	   absence	   of	   such	   an	   account	   in	   Shiffrin’s	  approach.18	  	  	  Quong’s	  own	  motivational	  account	  aims	  to	  avoid	  these	  implications.	  This	  is	   ‘the	  judgemental	  definition’,	  where	  paternalism	  is	  defined	  as	  any	  act	  where:	  	  1.	  Agent	  A	  attempts	   to	   improve	   the	  welfare,	  good,	  happiness,	  needs,	   interests	  or	  values	  of	  agent	  B	  with	  regard	  to	  a	  particular	  decision	  or	  situation	  that	  B	  faces	  2.	  A’s	  act	   is	  motivated	  by	  a	  negative	  judgement	  about	  B’s	  ability	  (assuming	  B	  has	  the	   relevant	   information)	   to	   make	   the	   right	   decision	   or	   manage	   the	   particular	  situation	  in	  a	  way	  that	  will	  effectively	  advance	  B’s	  welfare,	  good,	  happiness,	  needs,	  interests,	  or	  values.	  (Quong	  2011:	  80)	  In	  particular,	  Quong	  (2011:	  81-­‐82)	  argues	   that	  paternalism	   involves	  a	  negative	  judgement	   about	   agents’	   practical	   reasoning,	   willpower,	   and	   emotion	  management.	   He	   insists	   that	   if	   someone	   blamelessly	   lacks	   some	   relevant	  information,	   then	   this	   does	   not	   entail	   a	   negative	   judgement	   nor	   ground	  paternalist	   actions	   (Quong	   2011:	   82).	   Presumably,	   though,	   if	   this	   lack	   is	   not	  blameless,	  a	  negative	  judgement	  to	  this	  effect	  may	  ground	  paternalism.	  	  Quong	   (2011:	   100-­‐106)	   argues	   that	   this	   approach	   allows	   him	   to	   ground	   the	  wrong	   of	   paternalist	   acts	   not	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   overriding	   importance	   of	  autonomy,	   but	   because	   to	   treat	   someone	   paternalistically,	   in	   his	   sense,	   will	  involve	   treating	   that	   individual	   as	   if	   they	   lack	   the	   capacity	   to	   plan,	   revise,	   and	  rationally	   pursue	   their	   own	   conception	   of	   the	   good	   –	   Rawls’s	   second	   moral	  power.19	  Being	  motivated	  by	  a	  negative	   judgement	  about	  B’s	   capacities	   implies	  that	   the	  paternaliser	   treats	  B	  as	  having	  an	   inferior	   status:	   they	   trust	   their	  own	  capacities,	   but	   do	   not	   accord	  B’s	   the	   same	   respect.20	  Further,	   paternalistic	   acts	  insultingly	  “involve	  treating	  an	  adult	  as	   if	  he	  or	  she	  (at	   least	  temporarily)	   lacks	  the	   ability	   to	   rationally	  pursue	  his	   or	  her	   own	  good”	   (Quong	  2011:	  101).	   This,	  Quong	   insists,	   gives	   us	   reason	   to	   believe	   that	   paternalist	   policies	   are	  presumptively	  wrong.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  I	  have	  suggested	  how	  these	  legitimate	  domains	  of	  control	  might	  be	  identified	  in	  Begon	  (2013).	  	  19	  It	  may	   be	   objected	   that	   Quong	   still	   relies	   on	   autonomy	   insofar	   as	   disrespect	   for	   the	   second	  moral	  power	  just	  is	  disrespect	  for	  our	  capacity	  for	  autonomy	  (Mills	  2013a).	  Alternatively,	  we	  may	  think	  he	  has	  in	  mind	  the	  failure	  to	  respect	  the	  equal	  status	  of	  citizens	  (Fowler	  2014:	  310-­‐311).	  	  20	  It	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  a	  negative	  judgment	  alone	  does	  not	  constitute	  a	  motivation:	  alongside	  a	  factual	  belief	  that	  the	  target	  of	  the	  prospective	  intervention	  is	  lacking	  in	  some	  relevant	  capacity,	  the	   paternalist	  must	   act	   for	   some	   end	   to	  which	   she	   ascribes	   value	   (Fox	   unpublished).	   Indeed,	  Nicholas	   Cornell	   (2015)	   has	   argued	   that	   paternalism	   should	   be	   identified	   solely	   by	   what	   is	  expressed	  by	  the	  act,	  and	  not	  by	  its	  underlying	  motivation	  or	  intention.	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4.	  Is	  the	  Paternalist	  Motive	  Uniquely	  Insulting?	  	  Motivational	   accounts	   do	   seem	   to	   get	   at	   the	   core	   of	   why	   we	   worry	   about	  paternalistic	   interference:	  acting	  because	  we	  believe	   that	  someone	   is	   incapable	  of	   choosing	   well	   for	   themselves,	   or	   because	   we	   do	   not	   trust	   them	   to	   make	  decisions	  about	  matters	  that	  are	  legitimately	  within	  their	  control,	  does	  seem	  to	  involve	   treating	   adults	   as	   though	   they	   were	   children	   in	   a	   problematic	   way.	  However,	   it	   has	   been	   argued	   that	   the	   ‘paternalist	   motive’,	   however	   it	   is	  identified,	  is	  neither	  so	  unique,	  nor	  so	  insulting,	  as	  it	  is	  often	  assumed.	  Thus,	  we	  should	   not	   worry	   about	   all	   instances	   of	   paternalism,	   since	   the	   insult	   that	   it	  supposedly	   represents	   occurs	   on	   other	   occasions	   that	   we	   do	   not	   object	   to.	  Rather,	  we	   should	  object	  only	  when	   it	   restricts	  particular	  valuable	   liberties,	   or	  undermines	  central	  capacities	  (de	  Marneffe	  2006;	  2013;	  Shafer-­‐Landau	  2005).	  	  	  First,	  de	  Marneffe	  points	  out	  that	  a	  motivational	  approach	  might	  undermine	  the	  ‘project	   of	   reconciliation’	   that	   many	   anti-­‐paternalists	   undertake.	   Given	   that	  various	  seemingly	  paternalist	  policies	  appear	  highly	  plausible,	  those	  who	  wish	  to	  maintain	  an	  anti-­‐paternalist	  stance	  might	  engage	  in	  a	  process	  of	  providing	  a	  non-­‐paternalist	  justification	  for	  these	  policies.21	  For	  example,	  Shiffrin	  mounts	  such	  a	  defence	   of	   the	   unconscionability	   doctrine,	   which	   allows	   courts	   to	   decline	   to	  enforce	  contracts	  whose	  terms	  are	  one-­‐sided,	  exploitative,	  or	  unfair.	  She	  argues	  that	   the	   contractors	  do	  not	  have	   a	   right	   to	  unqualified	   assistance	   in	  upholding	  their	   contracts,	   and	   that	   the	   reasons	   for	   refusing	   this	   assistance	  might	   not	   be	  grounded	   in	   distrust	   of	   the	   abilities	   of	   the	   exploited	   party,	   but	   for	   the	   self-­‐regarding	  reason	  that	  the	  state	  does	  not	  want	  to	  be	  involved	  in	  such	  exploitation	  (Shiffrin	  2000:	  221-­‐224).	  However,	  if	  our	  only	  concern	  is	  motive,	  then	  we	  do	  not	  need	   to	   provide	   a	   good	   non-­‐paternalist	   justification:	   the	   mere	   psychological	  possibility	  of	  a	  non-­‐paternalist	  motive,	  however	  feeble	  the	  justification,	  suffices.	  Further,	  providing	  a	  good	  justification	  fails	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  policy	  is	  not	  paternalist,	  if	  this	  is	  not,	  in	  fact,	  what	  motivates	  the	  state	  (de	  Marneffe	  2006:	  71).	  	  	  Second,	   and	  more	   damagingly,	   de	   Marneffe	   (2006:	   78-­‐79)	   points	   out	   that	   the	  government	  commonly	  substitutes	  its	  judgement	  for	  that	  of	  its	  citizens,	  meaning	  that	   such	   distrust	   and	   substitution	   is	   not	   limited	   to	   cases	   of	   paternalism.	   For	  example,	  when	  imposing	  speed	  limits	  the	  government	  substitutes	  its	  judgement	  of	   what	   is	   best	   for	   citizens’	   judgements.	   If	   paternalism	   does	   not	   generate	   a	  
special	   insult,	   then	   its	   supposed	   uniqueness	   may	   not	   explain	   why	   we	   think	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  For	  example	  Feinberg	  (1986:	  79-­‐81);	  Anderson	  (1999:	  329-­‐332).	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paternalism	   matters	   (Fox	   unpublished).	   Further,	   such	   substitutions	   need	   not	  imply	  an	  insulting	  belief	  that	  individuals	  are	  “too	  stupid	  to	  run	  their	  own	  lives”	  (Anderson	   1999:	   330).	   Rather,	   such	   judgements	   might	   only	   imply	   “that	   his	  rationality	   is	   imperfect,	   and	   so	   is	   open	   to	   the	   kinds	   of	   error	   we	   all	   are”	   (de	  Marneffe	  2006:	  80).	  	  	  Indeed,	   there	   has	   been	   a	   recent	   proliferation	   of	   evidence	   that	   we	   are	   all	  frequently	   subject	   to	   errors	   in	   reasoning.22	  This	   has	   given	   rise	   to	   the	   ‘nudge’	  literature,	  which	  contends	  that	  default	  rules,	  framing	  effects	  and	  starting	  points	  influence	   our	   preferences	   such	   that	   it	   is	   often	   unclear	   what	   our	   ‘true’	   or	  authentic	  preferences	  are.	   Indeed,	   if	   our	   choices	  are	  determined	  by	   the	  way	   in	  which	  we	  are	  presented	  with	  the	  options,	  then	  it	  may	  be	  that	  we	  do	  not	  have	  true	  preferences	  at	  all	   in	  some	  cases.	  Many	  examples	  are	  discussed	  in	  the	  literature,	  including	  the	  changes	  in	  children’s	  choice	  of	  food	  depending	  on	  where	  items	  are	  placed	  in	  a	  cafeteria,	  the	  rate	  and	  level	  of	  uptake	  of	  pension	  plans	  depending	  on	  the	   default	   option,	   and	   willingness	   to	   undergo	   an	   operation	   depending	   on	  whether	  it	  is	  presented	  as	  having	  a	  90%	  survival	  rate	  over	  five	  years,	  or	  a	  10%	  death	  rate.	  	  	  Sunstein	  and	  Thaler	  have	  argued	  that	  these	  influences	  mean	  that	  paternalism	  is	  inevitable.	   If	   policy	   cannot	  but	   shape	   our	   choices	   and	   preferences,	   surely	   they	  should	  be	  shaped	  in	  the	  best	  interests	  of	  those	  affected.	  Yet	  they	  also	  insist	  that	  such	   paternalism	   can	   be	   libertarian:	   though	   individuals	   are	   nudged	   into	   doing	  what	  is	  in	  their	  best	  interests,	  they	  are	  not	  compelled.	  Thus,	  their	  liberty	  and	  free	  choice	   is	   not	   restricted,	   so	   libertarians	   could	   have	   no	   grounds	   for	   complaint.	  Paternalism	  of	   this	  sort	  may	  not,	   in	   fact,	  be	   insulting,	   then,	  contrary	   to	  motive-­‐based	  accounts.	  	  There	   has	   been	   a	   considerable	   critical	   response	   to	   Sunstein	   and	   Thaler’s	  proposal,	   and	   I	   cannot	  do	   justice	   to	  all	   of	   it	  here.23	  Some	  have	  argued	   that	   this	  libertarian	  paternalism	  is	  not	  really	   libertarian,	   insofar	  as	   it	   is	  manipulative,	  or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  For	  example,	  Thaler	  and	  Sunstein	  (2008);	  Le	  Grand	  and	  New	  (2015);	  Conly	  (2013);	  Kahneman	  and	   Tversky	   (1973;	   1974;	   2000);	   Kahneman	   (2011);	   Trout	   (2005);	   Glaeser	   (2005).	   Indeed,	  Kristoffer	   Ahlstrom-­‐Vij	   (2013)	   has	   argued	   that	   paternalism	  may	   be	   justified	   for	   our	   epistemic	  good:	  an	  approach	  he	  calls	  epistemic	  paternalism.	  	  23	  See,	   for	   example,	   Goodwin	   (2012);	   Guala	   and	  Mittone	   (2015);	   Hanna	   (2011);	   Hausman	   and	  Welch	   (2010);	   Klick	   and	   Mitchell	   (2006);	   Mills	   (2013b;	   2015);	   Mitchell	   (2005);	   Rachlinski	  (2003);	  Rebonato	  (2012);	  Salvat	  (2008);	  Schnellenbach	  (2012);	  Smith	  and	  MacPherson	  (2009);	  Sugden	  (2008);	  Wilkinson	  (2013).	  For	  a	  partial	  response,	  see	  Sunstein	  (2014a).	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bypasses	  our	  capacity	  for	  rational	  agency	  as	  opposed	  to	  engaging	  with	  it.24	  Some	  have	  argued	  that	  it	  is	  not	  really	  paternalist	  insofar	  as	  the	  nudges	  may	  not	  always	  be	   in	   the	   interests	   of	   those	   who	   are	   subject	   to	   them.	   Individuals	   are	   nudged	  towards	  what	  will	  make	  the	  standard	  individual	  better-­‐off,	  but	  choices	  that	  are	  good	  for	  a	  majority	  may	  not	  be	  good,	  and	  can	  even	  be	  very	  bad	  (possibly	  deadly),	  for	  a	  minority.25	  	  	  Further,	   it	   has	   been	   objected	   that,	   contrary	   to	   Sunstein	   and	   Thaler’s	   (2003)	  initially	  stated	  position,	  paternalist	  interference	  is	  not	  inevitable	  (Kelly	  2013;	  de	  Marneffe	  2006:	  71).	  Whilst	  some	  influences	  are	  impossible	  to	  avoid,	  it	  is	  not	  true	  that	   this	   influence	   need	   be	   paternalist.	   Sunstein	   and	   Thaler	   suggest	   that	   the	  alternatives	   to	   paternalism	   are	   morally	   reprehensible,	   or	   unfeasible.	   For	  example,	  in	  the	  cafeteria	  case,	  the	  alternatives	  they	  suggest	  to	  choosing	  an	  order	  that	   will	   make	   the	   children	   better	   off	   include	   choosing	   an	   order	   to	   maximise	  profits	  or	  to	  maximise	  sales	  from	  suppliers	  willing	  to	  offer	  the	  largest	  bribe;	  or	  alternatively,	   choosing	   an	   order	   that	  will	   lead	   to	   choices	   that	   correspond	  with	  the	   children’s	   ‘true’	   preferences	   (though	   it	   is	   unclear	   how	   these	   could	   be	  identified),	  or	  a	  random	  order	  (where	  the	  consequences	  may	  be	  very	  bad).	  Thus,	  paternalism	   is	   presumably	   seen	   as	   ‘inevitable’	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   being	   the	   only	  permissible	  use	  of	   the	  ability	   to	   influence	  decisions.	  Yet	   surely	   this	   is	  not	   true.	  Jamie	   Kelly	   (2013:	   222-­‐225)	   has	   outlined	   systems	   of	   utilitarian	   and	   Rawlsian	  nudges,	  according	  to	  which	  we	  influence	  choices	  to	  maximise	  the	  general	  good,	  or	  to	  promote	  Rawlsian	  justice.	  Indeed,	  Sunstein	  and	  Thaler	  (2003:	  1193;	  2008:	  184-­‐192)	  allow	  for	  non-­‐paternalistic	  nudges	  themselves:	  encouraging	  people	  to	  be	  organ	  donors	   is	   surely	  done	   for	   the	   general	   good,	   not	   for	   the	   sake	  of	   those	  who	  are	  subject	  to	  the	  influence	  of	  an	  opt-­‐out	  scheme	  of	  donor	  registration.26	  	  	  Given	   this,	   we	  may	   allow	   Sunstein	   and	   Thaler	   the	  weaker	   conclusion	   that	   the	  agents	  setting	  background	  conditions	  –	  perhaps	  especially	  when	  these	  agents	  are	  states	  –	  can	  sometimes	  permissibly	  nudge	   individuals	   for	   the	  sake	  of	   their	  own	  best	   interests.	   Returning	   to	   our	   objections	   to	   motive-­‐based	   accounts	   of	  paternalism,	   then,	  we	  may	   question	  whether	   distrust	   is	   always	   insulting	   if	  we	  acknowledge	  that	  we	  are	  all	  sometimes	  mistaken	  in	  our	  reasoning;	  and	  further,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Le	  Grand	  and	  New	  (2015:	  141-­‐142);	  Conly	  (2013:	  8);	  Bovens	  (2009:	  209);	  Blumenthal-­‐Barby	  (2013:	   188);	   Mills	   (2015);	   Grüne-­‐Yanoff	   (2012).	   Sunstein	   (2014b;	   2015b)	   has	   argued	   that	  requiring	  choice	  may	  still	  be	  paternalist.	  	  25	  Coons	  and	  Weber	  (2013:	  18;	  21);	  Salvat	  (2008:	  8);	  Blumenthal-­‐Barby	  (2013:	  183).	  	  26	  Indeed,	  Sunstein	  and	  Thaler	  (2003:	  1193)	  seem	  to	  acknowledge	  this	  point,	  given	  that	  they	  call	  this	  libertarian	  benevolence.	  See	  also	  Korobkin	  (2009);	  Smith	  and	  McPherson	  (2009);	  Guala	  and	  Mittone	  (2015).	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when	   influence	   is	   unavoidable,	   whether	   picking	   the	   paternalist	   option	   is	  necessarily	  more	  insulting	  than	  the	  alternatives.	  	  	  Finally,	   de	   Marneffe	   (2006:	   83)	   argues	   that	   “the	   purpose	   of	   government	   is	   to	  establish	  justice,	  and	  to	  promote	  the	  general	  welfare,	  consistent	  with	  respecting	  individuals’	   rights	   and	   other	   principles	   of	   fairness”.	   If	   this	   is	   so,	   then	  we	  may	  wonder	  whether	   it	   is	   really	   presumptively	   impermissible	   for	   a	   government	   to	  pursue	  non-­‐rights	  violating	  acts,	  motivated	  by	  the	  best	  interest	  of	  their	  citizens.	  Whilst	   we	   may	   have	   good	   reason	   to	   be	   concerned	   about	   the	   infringement	   of	  certain	   core	   freedoms,	   de	   Marneffe	   (2006:	   84)	   insists	   that	   our	   “status	   as	   an	  independent	   adult”	   is	   not	   undermined	   by	   every	   violation	   of	   liberty:	   being	  required	  to	  wear	  our	  seatbelt,	  for	  example.27	  	  	  Such	  concerns	  connect	  to	  those	  raised	  against	  soft	  paternalism,	  and	  are	  indeed	  a	  general	   refrain	   against	   any	   iteration	   of	   anti-­‐paternalism:	   whether	   paternalism	  involves	   interference	   with	   voluntary	   self-­‐harm,	   or	   actions	   motivated	   by	   a	  distrust	   of	   agents’	   judgements	   about	   their	   interests,	   surely	   it	   is	   fanaticism	   to	  insist	   that	  these	  policies	  are	  always	  pro	  tanto	   impermissible,	  regardless	  of	  how	  insignificant	   the	   restriction	   to	   our	   liberty	   or	   autonomy,	   or	   how	   great	   the	  contribution	  to	  our	  interests.28	  De	  Marneffe	  concludes,	  then,	  that	  we	  should	  not	  always	   distrust	   paternalist	   motives:	   sometimes	   paternalist	   arguments	   are	   the	  strongest	  ones	  on	  offer,	   in	  which	  case	  we	  should	  not	  demand	  that	   they	  are	  not	  used	  to	  justify	  particular	  actions.	  	  	  
5.	  Paternalism,	  Respect,	  and	  Exclusionary	  Reasons	  	  However,	  we	  might	   think	   that	   at	   least	   some	  of	   these	   criticisms	  miss	   the	  mark.	  Perhaps	   the	  problem	  with	  paternalism	   is	  not	   that	   individuals	  are	   insulted	  by	  a	  judgement	  that	   they	  cannot	  to	  be	  trusted	  to	  choose	  well	  about	  their	  welfare	  or	  interests,	   but	   that	   we	   use	   these	   judgements	   to	   ground	   actions,	   where	   this	  involves	   overriding	   individuals’	  wills,	   and	   interfering	  with	   their	   actions.	   David	  Enoch	  (2016)	  has	  recently	  argued	  that	  the	  wrong	  of	  paternalism	  does	  not	  lie	  in	  having	  a	  negative	  belief	  about	  others’	   future	  behaviour.	  Rather,	   it	   lies	   in	  acting	  on	  this	  belief.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  In	  response	  we	  may	  think	  that	  having	  our	  will	  ignored	  by	  the	  state	  –	  either	  as	  an	  individual,	  or	  as	   a	   collective	   –	  may	   be	   importantly	   disrespectful,	   even	   over	   apparently	   insignificant	  matters.	  The	  relevant	  problem	  with	  the	  undemocratic	   introduction	  a	  policy	  may	  not	  be	  the	  loss	  of	  some	  valuable	  opportunity,	  or	   ‘core	  freedom’,	  but	  that	  citizens	  are	  not	  respected	  as	  agents	  capable	  of	  choice	  (Begon	  2016:	  65-­‐68).	  	  28	  Arneson	  (2005:	  264;	  278);	  Sunstein	  and	  Thaler	  (2003:	  1165);	  Archard	  (unpublished:	  10).	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Enoch	   (2016:	   10)	   begins	   by	   arguing	   that	   if	   the	   evidence	   indicates	   that	   the	  potential	  subject	  of	  our	  paternalism	  will	   “make	  poor	  decisions,	  or	   fail	   to	   follow	  through	  on	  her	  good	  ones”,	   then	  we	  do	  not	  wrong	  her	  or	   fail	   to	   treat	  her	  with	  appropriate	  respect	   if	  we	  believe,	  as	  we	  should,	  “what	  the	  evidence	  sufficiently	  strongly	   indicates”.	   The	   same	   point	   can	   also	   be	  made	  when	  we	   do	   not	  merely	  make	   judgements	  about	  their	   likely	  behaviour,	  but	  distrust	   their	  very	  ability	   to	  deliberate	  and	  act	  rationally:	  “whether	  or	  not	  someone	  has	  the	  relevant	  abilities	  is	  a	  factual	  question,	  and	  whether	  or	  not	  we	  should	  believe	  this	  is,	  arguably,	  fully	  determined	  by	   the	  evidence”	  (Enoch	  2016:	  12).	  However,	  Enoch	  (2016:	  26-­‐30)	  suggests	  that	  we	  have	  exclusionary	  reasons,	  based	  on	  personal	  autonomy,	  not	  to	  act	  on	  this	  judgement.	  Thus,	  the	  paternalist	  does	  not	  err	  because	  they	  judge	  that	  we	  will	  make	   a	   poor	   decision,	   but	   because	   they	   allow	   this	   judgement	   to	   have	  weight	  in	  their	  deliberation	  about	  how	  to	  act.29	  	  The	  idea	  of	  exclusionary	  reasons	  is	  also	  central	  to	  Daniel	  Groll’s	  (2012)	  account.	  Groll	   argues	   that	  we	   can	   act	   paternalistically	   even	  when	  we	   act	   in	   accordance	  with	   someone’s	  will	   because	   it	   is	   their	  will.	   His	   central	   distinction	   is	   between	  treating	  someone’s	  will	  as	  authoritative,	  and	  treating	   it	  as	  part	  of	  an	  all-­‐things-­‐considered	   assessment	   of	   their	   good.	   A	   surrogate,	   deciding	   on	   a	   course	   of	  treatment	  for	  a	  non-­‐competent	  patient,	  might	   find	  that	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  patient	  does	  not	  want	  a	  procedure	  weighs	  most	  heavily	  in	  their	  deliberation	  on	  whether	  they	   should	   receive	   it	   (Groll	   2012:	   700).	   It	   is	   physically	   and	   psychologically	  distressing	  to	  be	  compelled	  to	  undergo	  a	  medical	  procedure;	  and,	  even	  when	  an	  individual	   lacks	   the	   competence	   to	  make	   their	   own	  medical	   decisions,	   part	   of	  what	   it	   is	   for	   their	   life	   to	   go	  well	  may	  be	   that	   their	  will	   plays	   a	   central	   role	   in	  determining	   the	   shape	  of	   their	   life	   (Groll	  2012:	  704).	   Such	   considerations	  may	  lead	  the	  surrogate	  to	  decide	  against	  treatment,	  despite	  the	  likely	  benefits	  to	  the	  patient’s	   health.	   In	   Groll’s	   terminology,	   their	   will	   is	   treated	   as	   substantially	  decisive.	  	  	  However,	   Groll	   argues	   that	   a	   competent	   patient	   would	   justifiably	   resent	   their	  doctor	  merely	  weighing	  their	  will	   in	   the	  balance	  of	  reasons	   in	   this	  way,	  even	   if	  they	  ultimately	  decide	  to	  act	  in	  accordance	  with	  his	  will.	  If	  we	  are	  competent,	  our	  will	  should	  be	  authoritative,	  or	  structurally	  decisive:	  “it	  is	  meant	  to	  supplant	  the	  reason-­‐giving	  force	  of	  other	  considerations	  not	  because	  it	  outweighs	  those	  other	  considerations	   but	   because	   it	   is	   meant	   to	   silence	   or	   exclude	   those	   other	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  As	  Tsai	  (2014:	  87-­‐88)	  notes,	  having	  a	  paternalist	  motive	  involves	  not	  just	  having	  an	  attitude	  of	  distrust	   and	   concern,	   but	   also	   endorsing	   these	   attitudes,	   such	   that	   they	   “issue	   in	   action”.	   It	   is	  paternalist	  action	  that	  troubles	  Tsai	  –	  actions	  motivated	  by,	  and	  conveying,	  this	  distrust	  –	  rather	  than	  merely	  having	  these	  attitudes.	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considerations”	  (Groll	  2012:	  701).	  On	  Groll’s	  account,	  treating	  someone’s	  will	  as	  merely	   substantially	   decisive	   is	   always	   paternalist.	   This	   paternalism	   is	  impermissible	  when	  we	  treat	  someone	  “whose	  will	  is	  intact”	  in	  this	  way,	  because	  we	   believe	   they	   will	   “fail	   to	   exercise	   a	   capacity	   for	   sound	   judgement	   in	   the	  situation	  at	  hand”	  (Groll	  2012:	  718).	  	  	  Although	  Groll	  does	  not	  define	  paternalism	  in	  terms	  of	  this	  motive,	   like	  Shiffrin	  and	  Quong,	   he	   sees	   the	  wrong	   of	   paternalism	  as	  deriving	   from	   the	  motive	   and	  attitude	   of	   the	   paternaliser.	   However,	   we	   do	   not	   avoid	   this	   wrong	   by	   always	  trusting	  individuals	  on	  matters	  relating	  to	  their	  own	  good	  or	  legitimate	  domains	  of	  control.	  We	  do	  not	  need	  to	  believe	  that	  individuals	  choose	  well,	  but	  we	  must	  nonetheless	  treat	  their	  will	  as	  authoritative	  because	  it	  is	  their	  will.	  	  	  
6.	  Conclusion	  	  We	  may	  remain	  unconvinced	  by	  these	  arguments.	  If	  paternalist	  interference	  can	  be	  good	   for	  us	  by	  our	  own	   lights	  –	   indeed,	  may	   improve	  our	  autonomy	  –	   then	  why	  insist	  that	  it	  is	  always	  prima	  facie	  impermissible?	  Alternatively,	  we	  might	  be	  persuaded	  that	  respecting	  individuals	  requires	  treating	  their	  will	  as	  decisive	  –	  as	  an	  exclusionary	  reason	  in	  the	  domains	  over	  which	  they	  have	  legitimate	  control	  –	  regardless	  of	  how	  much	  good	  could	  be	  done	  by	  ignoring	  it.	  There	  may	  no	  longer	  be	  a	  straightforward	  debate	  between	  paternalism	  and	  anti-­‐paternalism,	  but	  this	  is	   not	   to	   say	   there	   is	   anything	   like	   a	   consensus	  on	  how	  we	   should	  understand	  paternalism,	  nor	  what	  our	  attitude	  to	  paternalistic	  acts	  and	  agents	  should	  be.30	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